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ABSTRACT 
Reliable systems have always been built out of unreliable 
components [1].  Early on, the reliable components were small 
such as mirrored disks or ECC (Error Correcting Codes) in core 
memory. These systems were designed such that failures of these 
small components were transparent to the application. Later, the 
size of the unreliable components grew larger and semantic 
challenges crept into the application when failures occurred. 
Fault tolerant algorithms comprise a set of idempotent sub-
algorithms.  Between these idempotent sub-algorithms, state is 
sent across the failure boundaries of the unreliable components.  
The failure of an unreliable component can then be tolerated as a 
takeover by a backup, which uses the last known state and drives 
forward with a retry of the idempotent sub-algorithm.  Classically, 
this has been done in a linear fashion (i.e. one step at a time). 
As the granularity of the unreliable component grows (from a 
mirrored disk to a system to a data  center), the latency to 
communicate with a backup becomes unpalatable.  This leads to a 
more relaxed model for fault tolerance.  The primary system will 
acknowledge the work request and its actions without waiting to 
ensure that the backup is notified of the work.  This improves the 
responsiveness of the system because the user is not delayed 
behind a slow interaction with the backup. 
There are two implications of asynchronous state capture: 
1) Everything promised by the primary is probabilistic.  There is 
always a chance that an untimely failure shortly after the 
promise results in a backup proceeding without knowledge of 
the commitment.  Hence, nothing is guaranteed! 
2) Applications must ensure eventual consistency [20].  Since 
work may be stuck in the primary after a failure and reappear 
later, the processing order for work cannot be guaranteed. 
Platform designers are struggling to make this easier for their 
applications.  Emerging patterns of eventual consistency and 
probabilistic execution may soon yield a way for applications to 
express requirements for a “looser” form of consistency while 
providing availability in the face of ever larger failures. As we 
will also point out in this paper, the patterns of probabilistic 
execution and eventual consistency are applicable to 
intermittently connected application patterns.  
This paper recounts portions of the evolution of these trends, 
attempts to show the patterns that span these changes, and talks 
about future directions as we continue to “build on quicksand”. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an interesting connection between fault tolerance, 
offlineable systems, and the need for application-based eventual 
consistency.  As we attempt to run our large scale applications 
spread across many systems, we cannot afford the latency to wait 
for a backup system to remain in synch with the system actually 
performing the work.  This causes the server systems to look 
increasingly like offlineable client applications in that they do not 
know the authoritative truth.  In turn, these server-based 
applications are designed to record their intentions and allow the 
work to interleave and flow across the replicas.  In a properly 
designed application, this results in system behavior that is 
acceptable to the business while being resilient to an increasing 
number of system failures.   
This paper starts by examining the concepts of fault tolerance and 
posits an abstraction for thinking about fault tolerant systems.  
Next, section 3 examines how fault tolerant systems have 
historically provided the ability to transparently survive failures 
without special application consideration by using synchronous 
checkpointing to send the application state to a backup.  In section 
4, we begin to examine what happens when we cannot afford the 
latency associated with the synchronous checkpointing of state to 
the backup and, instead, allow the checkpointing of state to be 
asynchronous.  Section 5 examines in much more depth the ways 
in which an application must be modified to be true to its 
semantics while allowing asynchronous checkpointing of the 
application state to its backup.  Section 6 looks at a couple of 
example applications which offer correct behavior while allowing 
delays (i.e. asynchrony) in checkpointing state to the backup.  In 
section 7, we consider the management of resources when the 
operations may be reordered due to asynchrony.  Section 8 
examines the relationship between this class of eventual 
consistency and the CAP (Consistency, Availability, and 
Partition-tolerance) Theory.  Finally, in section 9, we consider 
some areas for future work. 
2. An Abstraction for Fault Tolerance 
In section 2, we discuss the broad ideas required to build a fault 
tolerant system.  First, we start by describing the external behavior 
of the systems we are considering.  Next, we describe what it can 
mean for these systems to offer transparent fault tolerance and not 
require special application consideration to cope with failures.  
Then, we quickly consider the issues associated with scalability of 
these systems.  Finally, we briefly discuss the role of transactions 
in the composition of these fault tolerant systems. 
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2.1 Modeling “The System” 
In considering interactions with a fault tolerant “system”, we want 
to look at its behavior as a black-box.  From the outside, requests 
are sent into the system for processing.  In years past, these 
requests looked like block mode screen input.  Nowadays, they 
typically take the form of XML, SOAP, and/or other web-style 
requests. 
To be robust, these incoming requests are retried by their source.  
In classic fashion, a request is issued and if a timer expires, it is 
reissued.  The fault tolerant server system had better make this 
work idempotent or the retries would occasionally result in 
duplicative work.  In practice, systems evolve to be idempotent as 
designers either anticipate the problem or make changes to fix it. 
To support this need for idempotence, either each request is 
submitted with a “uniquifier” that ensures the request is unique 
(and ensures retries will be associated with the original request), 
OR the service applies some trick to accomplish the same thing.  
An example trick is the creation of an MD5 hash of the entire 
incoming request.  With extremely high probability, the MD5 
hash is one-to-one correlated with a unique incoming request.  
So, the fault tolerant system processes a sequence of requests 
from an external partner.   The requests (and their responses) 
perform some business task or tasks. 
2.2 Transparent Fault Tolerance 
Fault tolerant systems comprise many components and their 
design goal is to continue functioning when one (or sometimes 
more than one) component fails.  In this discussion, we will not 
consider Byzantine Failures [6] in which a component may 
behave erroneously (and in the Byzantine analysis, potentially 
maliciously).  Instead, we assume fail fast [8] in which a 
component is either functioning correctly or simply stops 
functioning.  Fail fast does not address the possibility of 
components deliberately misbehaving.  Also, it leaves vague the 
question of what happens when a component performs so slowly 
that it wreaks havoc on the system.  For this discussion, we will 
address some issues present even with the simplifying 
assumptions of fail fast. 
 
 
We have observed the pattern in which a fault tolerant algorithm 
is broken into idempotent sub-algorithms.  By capturing sufficient 
information between the idempotent steps and sending it across 
the failure boundary, the overarching algorithm can tolerate faults. 
From this perspective, you can imagine stepping across a river 
from rock to rock, always keeping one foot on solid ground.  It is 
important to realize this provides a linear sequence of steps 
marching forward through the work. 
It turns out that many existing fault tolerant systems use this 
technique to make failures transparent to the application and to the 
user.  We will explore some examples of these systems. 
2.3 Scaling and Idempotent Sub-Algorithms 
In [15] one of the authors (Helland) argues that scalable and 
distributed applications need special attention when built without 
distributed transactions.  Distributed transactions (especially using 
the Two Phase Commit protocol [3]) result in fragile systems and 
reduced availability.  For this reason, they are rarely used in 
production systems, particularly when the resource managers span 
trust and authority boundaries.  In the paper cited above, it is 
proposed that a scalable application must apply a discipline of 
partitioning its data into chunks which can remain on a single 
node even when repartitioned.  Each chunk has a unique key. 
In the design of fault tolerance systems, we frequently see these 
idempotent sub-algorithms spread in a distributed fashion around 
the network.  One pattern that has been emerging is that these 
idempotent sub-algorithms follow the same co-location as 
described above.  All of their data and behavior reside on a single 
node even in the presence of repartitioning.  The collective data 
will be identified with some unique identifier (called a “key” in 
[15]) that ensures it remains on exactly one node at a time1. 
2.4 Transactions and Idempotence 
Transactions can make it EASIER to build idempotent sub-
algorithms.  Atomic transactions are, well, atomic and do not 
expose partial results.  By using transactions, many (but not all) of 
the challenges of creating idempotent behavior are eliminated.  
All that remains is to ensure the work is either not started more 
than once or that a second attempt will detect a successful first 
attempt and be innocuous.  Some examples of this will be shown. 
3. Preserving Transparency While Growing 
In this section, we examine how the Tandem NonStop system 
implemented transparent fault tolerance by leveraging 
synchronous checkpointing across the failure boundaries.  We 
first consider the Tandem system in approximately 1984 when the 
checkpointing strategy involved sending state to the backup as a 
part of every individual database WRITE operation.  This was 
correct but had some performance challenges.  In roughly 1985, 
the software was modified to a new strategy which had 
performance advantages.  So, we next examine the behavior of the 
Tandem systems in approximately 1986 when the checkpointing 
of state was less aggressive but still sufficient to provide the 
transparent guarantees.  We conclude section 3 with a discussion 
of why the change from the 1984 to 1986 versions was an erosion 
of the semantics of failures but was an acceptable erosion of the 
semantics experienced in a failure. 
                                                                
1 More precisely, the data resides on exactly one node when we 
ignore the need to do replication underneath the partition… 
more on that later. 
 CIDR Perspectives 2009 
3.1 Example 1: Tandem NonStop circa 1984 
The Tandem NonStop System is a shared-nothing multi-processor 
with a message-based interconnect [5].  Each processor has its 
own CPU, memory, access to the messaging busses, and access to 
IO-Controllers.  Each IO-controllers is dual ported and can be 
accessed by either of two processors in the system.  Pairs of IO-
Controllers accessed mirrored disks.  This hardware architecture, 
combined with the Guardian operating system, Transaction 
Monitoring Facility (TMF), and Disk Process (DP) offered 
industry leading availability [8] for OLTP systems through the 
1980s and continuing today. 
 
To perform transactional application work, an app runs in one of 
the processes and uses messages to do READS and WRITES to 
the Disk Processes which manage the data and generate log 
records for the transactional log.  Work is actively checkpointed2 
for each WRITE to ensure the backup is able to continue in the 
event of a failure of the primary disk processor.  At transaction 
commit, all dirtied DPs are asked to flush their log to a centralized 
ADP (Audit Disk Process). 
                                                                
2 A checkpoint is a technique used to manage state in a Process 
Pair as described in [12].  Two identical processes run on 
different processors, one the primary and one the backup.  A 
checkpoint is a message from the primary to the backup 
describing needed state to ensure fault tolerant service. 
 
It is interesting to note the granularity of the pieces in the 
approach to fault tolerance.  Each WRTE operation is idempotent 
and, circa 1984, was actively checkpointed to the backup DP [4].  
The granularity of the failure is a single process or processor.  The 
granularity of the “idempotent sub-algorithm” is a single WRITE 
to the DP which gets checkpointed.  Failures of a primary DP do 
not necessarily cause a failure of the transaction. 
 
3.2 Example 2: Tandem NonStop circa 1986 
In 1985, a new software release of the Tandem NonStop Guardian 
operating system included a new Disk Process called DP2.  This 
release offered a number of changes including a dramatic 
optimization in the strategy for fault tolerance [7]. 
DP2, a completely redesigned disk process, had a whole new 
approach to checkpointing.  The transaction log, describing the 
changes to the state on disk, was also used to describe the changes 
that should be known to the backup disk process.  In other words, 
checkpointing and transaction logging were combined into one 
mechanism.  The log would first go to the backup, then to the 
ADP which would write it on disk. 
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A design goal was to allow the changes for a transactional 
WRITE to lollygag within the transactional log in memory of the 
primary DP2 Disk Process.  The WRITE to the primary DP2 
could be answered back to the application.  Of course, this left 
open the challenge of correctness if a failure wipes out the 
primary DP2 with buffered changes done by uncommitted 
WRITEs.  How can this be correct? 
The key to the new approach to correctness in this example was to 
ensure that any in-flight transactions that used a failed primary DP 
would have their transactions aborted.  Since all committed 
transactions will have pushed their changes to disk, any loss of the 
memory state when a primary DP fails will only impact an in-
flight transaction.  Since the system automatically aborts any 
relevant in-flight transactions when the primary DP fails, 
correctness is preserved. 
 
This scheme meant that a processor failure would result in more 
transactions aborting.  This was a very rare event and was 
completely within the system rules which allowed transactions to 
abort without cause.  Arguably, this change was almost 
transparent to application developers and to users. 
 
The new scheme offered a huge performance improvement.  A 
WRITE to DP2 could be performed without checkpointing to the 
backup.  This was a dramatic savings in CPU cost and an even 
more dramatic savings in latency since the application did not 
need to wait for the checkpoint to see the response to the WRITE.  
The buffer containing the log entries shifted to being pushed to 
the backup (and, indeed, to the ADP) on a periodic basis.  This is 
much like group commit [11].  It is easy to understand the 
efficiency when you think of the difference between a car per 
driver racing across town versus a city bus sweeping up all the 
passengers every five minutes or so.  As described in [11], waiting 
to participate in shared buffer writes can, under the right 
circumstances, result in a reduction of latency since the overall 
system work is reduced.  This reduction in work may reduce 
system utilization and may more than compensate for the delay. 
Looking back at our abstraction for fault tolerance, we see that the 
idempotent sub-algorithm has grown from a WRITE to a 
transaction.  The granule of failure is still a processor and the 
application and user barely perceive the change in algorithm. 
3.3 An Acceptable Erosion of Behavior 
Tandem’s system in 1986 offered significantly better performance 
than its predecessor in 1984.  Still, there were failures of 
processors that would yield different behavior than the previous 
release.   When a processor failed in the middle of a transaction, 
the earlier release would continue forward.  Circa 1986, a 
processor failure may result in the loss of the ongoing transaction. 
While this was technically a change in behavior, there were 
reasons why this was acceptable.  All along, the system rules for 
transactions allowed the transaction to be aborted without 
(apparent) cause.  Deadlocks, operator decisions, timeouts, and 
other reasons could cause transactions to fail.  Because of this, the 
change was an acceptable erosion of behavior. 
The 1984 version of the Tandem system implemented 
synchronous WRITES to the backup.   The WRITE from the 
user’s application was not acknowledged until checkpointed.  
Circa 1984, the WRITES were asynchronous but the transaction 
commit was guaranteed to be synchronously checkpointed across 
the failure boundaries. 
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4. The Creeping Arrival of Asynchrony 
In this section, we see the first example of acknowledging the 
incoming request BEFORE ensuring the work is sent to the 
backup.  This is asynchronous checkpointing to the backup. 
We start with a very simple discussion of “log-shipping” wherein 
the transaction log is sent to a backup system sometime after the 
user request is acknowledged.  This is a fundamental change 
which deeply impacts the guarantees made to the user. 
After introducing log-shipping, we discuss the takeover semantics 
of this approach.  Following this, we look at how this asynchrony 
means we have to revisit our abstraction for fault tolerance. 
4.1 Example 3: Log Shipping 
This example is well known to most readers.  A classic database 
system has a process that reads the log and ships it to a backup 
data-center.  The normal implementation of this mechanism 
commits transactions at the primary system (acknowledging the 
user’s commit request) and asynchronously ships the log.  The 
backup database replays the log, constantly playing catch-up. 
Typically, applications and users are oblivious to log-shipping.  
Unless a fault occurs, the application and the user are fat, dumb, 
and happy.  When a fault DOES occur, some recent transactions 
are lost as the backup takes-over and provides service. 
This means that the abstraction described above in section 2 
works here except the state is not immediately captured by the 
backup.  Fault tolerance is NOT transparent.  It is OK (with low 
probability) to completely discard recent work. 
To allow a datacenter failure to be transparent, the log shipping 
algorithm would need to stall the response to the commit request 
at the primary until the primary knows the backup has received 
the log.  This delay is unacceptable in most installations and they 
deal with the low probability chance of losing recent work. The 
change from a synchronous transfer of state to an asynchronous 
transfer is an interesting erosion of the basic abstraction and is 
another example of where the cost for “consistency at a distance” 
is too high just as it was when tried to stretch 2PC beyond 
resource managers in the same room. 
Log-shipping: Our first example where giving a little bit in 
consistency yields a lot of resilience and scale!  
4.2 Log Shipping and Takeover Semantics 
Log shipping is asynchronous to the response to the client.  This 
inherently opens up a window in which the work is acknowledged 
to the client but it has not yet been shipped to the backup.  A 
failure of the primary during this window will lock the work 
inside the primary for an unknown period of time.  The backup 
will move ahead without knowledge of the locked up work. 
In most deployments of log-shipping, this is not considered in the 
application design.  It is assumed that this window is rare and that 
it is unnecessary to plan for it.  Bad stuff just happens if you get 
unlucky.  Unfortunately, in most of these systems, a takeover 
either requires manual cleanup of the work not transferred from 
the primary to the backup or the work is simply lost. 
4.3 Revisiting the Abstraction 
So, we’ve seen a basic model for fault tolerance and how it can be 
applied in a few different systems.  In the first two examples, the 
fallible component was a processor running in the same box as its 
partner.  The close proximity of the components allowed for 
practical use of synchronous state copying.  In the log shipping 
example, the delay is considered impractical and the transfer of 
the state is asynchronous.  This results in “faults” in the fault 
tolerance provided for data center failures. 
5. Loosening the Abstraction 
OK… So, maybe there’s a broader abstraction at play!   
The old model assumed the work would be processed in exactly 
one order of execution.  There was a default “single system of 
record” form of isolation provided by the classic database system 
running at the primary.  This single history allows for a low-level 
READ and WRITE semantic that depends on “replaying history”. 
In this new world, history cannot be exactly replayed and we must 
count on the ability to reorder the work.  This means that we 
cannot completely know the accurate state of the system.  It also 
means we must move the correctness and reordering semantics up 
from being based on system properties (i.e. READ and WRITE) 
to application based business operations. 
Section 5 examines a number of different aspects of asynchronous 
checkpointing and how it impacts application design.  We will 
first discuss the impact of asynchrony on our ability to know the 
actual true state of the application.  Then, we look at probabilistic 
business rules and how asynchronous checkpointing means we 
cannot have definitive enforcement of business rules.   We discuss 
the impact of commutativity on the business rules.  Next, we 
consider partitioning of the work and idempotent operations 
across the partitioned state.  After this, we examine the possibility 
of having a choice of sometimes performing synchronous 
checkpointing of state if the risk for the specific operation is too 
great.  Next, we consider how the system may handle 
unanticipated problems and when human intervention may be 
required.  After that, there is a discussion of how asynchronous 
enforcement of business rules sometimes results in apologies.  
Finally, we summarize the abstraction by observing that either 
you have synchronous checkpoints to your backup or you must 
sometimes apologize for your behavior… 
5.1 Asynchrony and the Truth 
Let’s consider those orphaned transactions dawdling in the belly 
of the failed system in the log-shipping example.  They are most 
certainly out of the picture while the dethroned system (or data 
center) is unavailable.  When it does return, the goal of any recov-
ery policy would be to examine the work in the tail of the log and 
determine what the heck to do!  The backup system has continued 
and there may be challenges when resurrecting the languishing 
work.  The only way this work can be kept is to ensure that the 
out-of-order retrying of the work does not break things.  In some 
cases, the pending work is simply discarded due to lack of 
designed mechanisms to reclaim it!  This is part of the implicit 
consistency model for log-shipping without recovery of lost work. 
In the log-shipping example, we see rare cases of work reordering 
as it is temporarily lost and then resurrected.  In the more general 
case, we see independent work performed at disconnected (or 
slowly connected) sites which may get reordered as it becomes 
visible to other systems partnering in the work. 
The deeper observation is that two things are coupled: 
1) The change from synchronous checkpointing to 
asynchronous to save latency, and 
2) The loss of a notion of an authoritative truth. 
Back when we had a centralized machine with synchronous 
checkpointing, we knew the one and only one answer at any given 
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point in time.  Allowing for work being locked up in an 
unavailable backup (née primary) means we don’t know the truth. 
5.2 Probabilistic Business Rules 
When we have asynchronous checkpointing, we have windows of 
failure that mean work may be lost or delayed.  When a primary 
fails, there may be work stuck inside the primary that has not yet 
been sent to the backup.  That work is either lost or delayed. 
If a primary uses asynchronous checkpointing and applies a 
business rule on the incoming work, it is necessarily a 
probabilistic rule.  The primary, despite its best intentions cannot 
know it will be alive to enforce the business rules. 
When the backup system that participates in the enforcement of 
these business rules is asynchronously tied to the primary, the 
enforcement of these rules inevitably becomes probabilistic! 
It is the cost/benefit analysis that values lower latency from 
asynchronous checkpointing higher than the risk of slippage in the 
business rule that generalizes the fault tolerant algorithm. 
Distribution + Asynchrony  Probabilities of Enforcement 
We are seeing the emergence of applications which take this even 
farther by increasing disconnection to achieve the economic 
benefits of loose-coupled parallelism and offline.  They are lower 
latency, more parallel, and more available.  They just screw up 
more often and sort the mess out later.  Sometimes, that’s good! 
5.3 Commutativity and Business Rules 
In many applications, it is possible to express the business rules of 
the application and allow different operations to be reordered in 
their execution.  When the operations occur on separate systems 
and wind their way to each other, it is essential to preserve these 
business rules.   
Example business rules may be: “Don’t overbook the airplane by 
more than 15%” or “Don’t overdraw the checking account”.   
Escrow Locking in Serializable Databases 
Escrow locking is a scheme to increase concurrency while 
preserving classic transactional ACID behavior.   
If you assume a set of commutative operations (such as 
addition and subtraction), you ensure changes are logged 
via “operation logging”.  Operation logging does not capture 
the before and after images of the value but rather logs 
“Transaction T1 subtracted $10”.  If transaction T1 needs to 
be aborted, the system would add $10 rather than restore 
the value that existed in the field before T1.  In this fashion, 
the work of multiple transactions can interleave as long as 
they are doing the commutative operations.  If any 
transaction dares to READ the value, that does not 
commute, is annoying, and stops other concurrent work. 
Escrow locking can be implemented in conjunction with 
constraints enforcing business rules.  Consider addition and 
subtraction operations with a worst-case minimum and 
maximum for the value.  The system simply needs to track 
the worst case for all the transactions pending commitment.  
A new operation will be delayed if it MIGHT cause the value 
to fall out of bounds with the pending work. 
Escrow locking offers crisp semantics because it is 
functioning on a centralized location and can enforce the 
worst case outcome of the business rules. 
This approach is similar to escrow locking as described in [9].  In 
escrow locking, commutative operations are allowed as long as 
they do not violate the constraints of the system.  Escrow locking 
was envisaged as a pessimistic locking scheme which crisply 
preserved serializable behavior.  Escrow locking was 
implemented in Tandem’s NonStop SQL in the late 1980s to 
support high-throughput addition and subtraction. 
WRITES to a database are not commutative! 
The layering of an arbitrary application atop a storage 
subsystem inhibits reordering.  Only when commutative 
operations are used can we achieve the desired loose 
coupling.  Application operations can be commutative.  
WRITE is not commutative.  Storage (i.e. READ and 
WRITE) is an annoying abstraction… 
5.4 Idempotence and Partitioned Workflow 
It is essential to ensure that the work of a single operation is 
idempotent.  This is an important design consideration in the 
creation of an application that can handle asynchrony as it 
tolerates faults and as it allows loose-coupling for latency, scale, 
and offline.  
Each operation must occur once (i.e. have the business impact of a 
single execution) even as it is processed (or simply logged) at 
multiple replicas.  One room reservations must (with high 
probability) result in exactly one room set aside for the guest.  
One book ordered online should not (very often) result in two 
books delivered to the customer. 
To ensure this, applications typically assign a unique number or 
ID to the work.  This is assigned3 at the ingress to the system (i.e. 
whichever replica first handles the work).  As the work request 
rattles around the network, it is easy for a replica to detect that it 
has already seen that operation and, hence, not do the work twice. 
Sometimes, incoming work stimulates other work.  For example, 
processing a purchase order may result in scheduling a shipment.  
Two replicas may get overly enthusiastic about the incoming 
purchase order and each schedule a shipment.  By uniquely 
identifying the purchase order at its ingress to the system, the 
irrational exuberance on the part of the replicas can be identified 
as the knowledge sloshes through the network.  We will see below 
in the discussions of eventual consistency how this can 
(probabilistically) be rectified. 
 
 
                                                                
3 The experienced reader will realize that this leaves the concern 
for idempotence in the incoming message from the client as 
captured at the point of ingress.  Retries could cause two or 
more different replicas to charge ahead to help the user.  If the 
work has no side effects (such as simply reading something), it 
is OK to do the work multiple times.  If the work has side-
effects, coordination around a cookie or user-id is usually 
performed to eliminate duplicates.   
To avoid duplicate processing, the uniquifier for the request 
should be functionally dependent only on the request as seen by 
the server system.  This is possible if the unique id is generated 
outside the server (e.g. a check number as discussed in Section 
6.2) and it is also possible if the server calculates it in a 
predictable way as discussed in Section 2.1). 
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The unique identifier of the work (the “uniquifier”) has two very 
important roles: 
1) The uniquifier provides the key for partitioning the work in a 
scalable system. 
2) The uniquifier allows the system to recognize multiple 
executions of the same request.  In  this fashion, they can be 
collapsed and the work becomes idempotent. 
5.5 What’s Your Stomach for Risk? 
In all these cases, we started with the assumption that the cost to 
know the truth is prohibitive for the application in question.  
Hence, we are designing the system and, especially, the 
application running on the system to probably deliver excellent 
service and, occasionally, to violate the business rules of the 
application. 
Note that that it is possible to have multiple business rules with 
different guarantees.  Some operations can choose classic 
consistency over availability (i.e. they will slow down, eat the 
latency, and make darn sure before promising).  Other operations 
can be more cavalier.  Some examples: 
 Locally clear a check if the face value is less than $10,000.  
If it exceeds $10,000, double check with all the replicas to 
make sure it clears. 
 Schedule the shipment of a “Harry Potter” book based on a 
local opinion of the inventory.  In contrast, the one and only 
one Gutenberg bible requires strict coordination! 
The major point is that availability (and its cousins offline 
and latency-reduction) may be traded off with classic 
notions of consistency.  This tradeoff may frequently be 
applied across many different aspects at many levels of 
granularity within a single application. 
5.6 Fussing and Whining (but Not Too Often) 
So, what the heck does the application DO when its business rules 
are violated?  The application will usually be managing the proba-
bilities so that this is unlikely (since there is frequently a business 
cost associated with screwing up).  Still, this will happen! 
The best model for coping with violations of the business rule is: 
1. Send the problem to a human (via email or something else), 
2. If that’s too expensive, write some business specific software 
to reduce the probability that a human needs to be involved. 
While this may sound too simplistic, it is what applications 
typically do when dealing with these complex issues.  It also 
points out that, in the absence of generalizations of the business 
rules, the patterns used by the business operations for 
commutativity, and the business complications of 
overzealousness, it is not possible to speak to the business 
consequences or actions to compensate when your luck is bad. 
5.7 Memories, Guesses, and Apologies 
Arguably, all computing really falls into three categories: 
memories, guesses, and apologies[16, 19].  The idea is that 
everything is done locally with a subset of the global knowledge.  
You know what you know when an action is performed.  Since 
you have only a subset of the knowledge, your actions are really 
only guesses.  When your knowledge as a replica increases, you 
may have an “Oh, crap!” moment.  Reconciling your actions (as a 
replica) with the actions of an evil-twin of yours may result in 
recognition that there’s a mess to clean up.  That may involve 
apologizing for your behavior (or the behavior of a replica). 
So, consider these three aspects: 
 Memories: Your local replica has seen what it has seen and 
(hopefully) remembers it.  The cost of spreading that 
knowledge includes bandwidth, computation, and latency (in 
the case where you are waiting for the backup to 
acknowledge your memory of an operation). 
 Guesses: Any time an application takes an action based upon 
local information, it may be wrong.   This occurs in log-
shipping systems where the action is logged locally and has 
only a very high probability of getting to the backup system 
before a crash and take-over.  That makes it a good guess but 
it doesn’t make it a sure bet.  In any system which allows a 
degradation of the absolute truth, any action is, at best, a 
guess.  It is simply a matter of business choice as to the 
quality of the guess. 
 Apologies:  When a mistake is made (either due to 
replication anomalies or because the FAA grounds your jets 
and you cannot honor your flight reservations), you 
apologize.  Every business includes apologies.  As mentioned 
above, these may be manual with the software enqueuing the 
problem for human work. Alternatively, application code 
may issue some apologies for which it has specially designed 
apology code while asking for human help for those 
apologies beyond its designed cases. 
In a loosely coupled world choosing some level of availability 
over consistency, it is best to think of all computing as memories, 
guesses, and apologies. 
5.8 Synchronous Checkpoints OR Apologies! 
So, section 5 is pointing out that there are design options: 
1) You can synchronously checkpoint and incur the latency, or 
2) You can asynchronously checkpoint, save the latency, and 
experience modified application semantics. 
These modified semantics mean that you don’t always know the 
precise truth because work can be trapped in a partner.  They 
mean you may have to understand that the business rules are 
enforced probabilistically and may experience reordering.  Still, 
you have the option of sometimes applying business criterion (e.g. 
the check being for more than $10,000) which cause synchronous 
checkpointing.  Also, it is completely viable to allow human 
intervention in the resolution of some problems if the chance of 
this occurring is low enough for this to be cost effective. 
In summary, all of these choices depend on their business value! 
6. Zen and the Art of Eventual Consistency4 
This section looks in more depth at eventual consistency and how 
loosely-coupled applications are built to support this.  We start 
with a couple of examples: Amazon’s Dynamo storage with a 
Shopping Cart application on top of it and a classic bank check 
clearing application.  We then talk about applications 
implementing eventual consistency and contrast this with the 
difficulties of building eventual consistency in a storage layer.  
Finally, we discuss the importance of an “operation-centric” 
approach to eventual consistency in which the operations desired 
by the user of the application are recorded and become the 
foundation for the implementation of eventual consistency. 
                                                                
4 We recommend the classic book “Zen and the Art of Motorcycle 
Maintenance” [2].  A looser, more Zen-like, perspective can be 
helpful in computing and in one’s personal life… 
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6.1 Example 4: Shopping Cart and Dynamo 
The Dynamo Storage system [18] is used to support the shopping 
cart store as well as other systems within Amazon.  Dynamo is a 
replicated blob store implemented with a Dynamic Hash Table 
(DHT).  Dynamo is interesting in many ways including its 
conscious choice to support availability over consistency.  
Dynamo always accepts a PUT to the store even if this may result 
in an inconsistent GET later on. 
In [18], the interaction from the application to Dynamo is 
described as a PUT and GET interface.  Due to replication 
anomalies, a GET may return old information.  Performing a PUT 
based on the old information results in parallel versions.  A later 
GET of this blob may return two sibling (or cousin) versions 
which the shopping cart application must reconcile.  Dynamo, 
acting as a storage substrate, may present two or more old 
versions in response to a GET.  A subsequent PUT must include a 
blob that integrates and reconciles all the presented versions. 
To do the application level integration, the shopping cart 
application must record its operations much like a ledger entry.  A 
deletion of an item from the shopping cart is recorded as an 
operation appended to the cart.  These “ADD-TO-CART”, 
“CHANGE-NUMBER”, and “DELETE-FROM-CART” 
operations can usually be reconciled when a union of the 
operations is finally joined together.  Very rare anomalies in the 
shopping cart are acceptable since the shopper’s order is verified 
as a part of order submission.  Unavailability of the shopping cart 
service is very expensive for Amazon since it results in a drop in 
business and an unsatisfying user experience.  
Dynamo is a storage substrate independent of the shopping cart 
application layered on top of it.  Dynamo returns a blob (and 
sometimes two or more blobs) to a GET.  When more than one is 
returned, the shopping cart application has to reconcile the 
confusion AND fold in the new operation it was planning for the 
cart.  The shopping cart application can do this by understanding 
the contents of the cart as a set of operations.  Uniquely 
referenced operations on the items can be unioned together into a 
list with a predictable outcome.  This is key to the commutativity 
of operations on the shopping cart.  This, in turn, is used to 
provide exceptionally high availability. 
6.2 Example 5: Bank Accounts and Ledgers 
There is a reason for check-numbers on checks.  The check 
numbers (combined with the bank-id and account-number) 
provide a unique identifier.  Excepting big mistakes (and/or 
fraud), the payee and amount for a specific check are immutable.  
The check enters the banking system with a unique identifier and 
the participants in the loosely-coupled process share information 
in what may be considered an ongoing workflow.5 
You deposit your brother-in-law’s check for $100 into your bank 
account and, since you’ve been a good customer, there is no hold 
on the money.  Your account’s balance bumps up from $1000 to 
$1100.  Your bank account information is associated with the 
                                                                
5 This mechanism has been used for many years and pre-dates 
computerized systems.  It was used by our grandparents for the 
same reason that we advocate the use of a unique-id that is 
functionally dependent on the incoming request (either by being 
part of the request or by being derived from the request).  The 
check-number (along with bank and account number) is a 
wonderful unique-id. 
check.  The check is forwarded to you brother-in-law’s bank.  
Later, when the check bounces, your account is debited $130 (the 
original $100 plus $30 bounce fee).  Interestingly, the decision to 
be optimistic is based on YOUR good standing with the bank.  A 
less desirable customer (like your brother-in-law) would have a 
hold placed on the money (reserving for a potential bounce)6. 
Debits and credits to bank accounts are commutative.  There is an 
expressed business rule that the account balance will not drop 
below zero.  If you had spent the $1100 before your brother-in-
law’s check was returned, your account would have violated the 
business rule when your brother-in-law’s check bounced.  
Banking policies make this less likely but not impossible.  It is a 
business decision on the part of the bank to allow this risk. 
Consider, too, the ledger associated with a bank account.  At the 
end of the month, a statement is issued.  It is not critical that it be 
perfect.  Some check floating on midnight of the 31st of the month 
may land in this month’s statement or in next month’s statement. 
The monthly statement starts out with a balance.   Debits and 
credits are applied.  Once it is issued, it is permanent and 
immutable.  Errors in March’s statement may be adjusted in 
April’s statement but March’s statement is never modified. 
The bank has two jobs to do with the account.  First, it needs to 
decide if a check should clear based upon the best knowledge of 
the account’s balance.  Second, it needs to meticulously remember 
all the operations (debits and credits) performed on the account. 
 
Imagine a replicated bank system which has two (or more) copies 
of my bank account, both of which are clearing checks. There is a 
small (but present) possibility that multiple checks presented to 
different replicas will cause an overdraft that is not detected in 
time to bounce one of the checks.  Each replica that clears a check 
will remember the check with its check number.  Assuming no 
replica is permanently destroyed, the information about the check 
will be added to the bank statement and funding allocated for it.  
A very untimely outage could result in the check landing in next 
month’s statement rather than this month but that’s no big deal. 
                                                                
6 It does make sense to base the decision on YOUR standing… 
It’s the only information available locally to the bank and YOU 
are more likely to eat the cost than the bank. 
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In this banking system, the information about the checks can be 
coalesced as the replicas communicate.  The usage of check 
numbers makes the processing of the check idempotent.  The 
nature of the operations (i.e. addition and subtraction) ensures the 
work is both commutative AND associative. 
It is VERY likely that a banking system layered on flakey 
computers without raised floors, operators, or backup power 
would be more cost effective than a high-priced centralized one.  
As demonstrated above, the dissection of the work into memories, 
guesses, and apologies is exactly how banks function today. 
6.3 Eventual Consistency and Applications 
In both the Dynamo/ShoppingCart example and in the banking 
example, uniquely identified work arrives into the system and is 
processed by a single replica.  The work is propagated to other 
replicas as connectivity allows. 
Because the requests are commutative (i.e. reorderable), it is OK 
for them to be processed at different replicas in different orders.  
The chances are very high that the result will be the same.  Also, 
the design of each system includes business policies for resolving 
what will happen if the different orders of execution result in 
different answers. 
6.4 Eventual Consistency and Storage  
It is interesting that much of the literature on eventual consistency 
focuses on READ and WRITE semantics. For example, a recent 
paper [20] by Werner Vogels explains many great concepts in the 
area of eventual consistency but still couches the discussion in the 
context of clients, storage systems, and updates.   
The Amazon Dynamo paper [18] covers many fascinating topics 
and shows how Dynamo is a key-value blob store.  Still, section 
4.4 on Data Versioning discusses the use of “add to cart” and 
“delete item from cart” and how these operations are captured 
within the blobs being stored by Dynamo.  Even if the version 
histories are reordered, items added to the cart will not be lost 
once their stored blob version is collapsed together with the other 
versions.  Occasionally deleted items will reappear. 
Storage systems alone cannot provide the commutativity we need 
to create robust systems that function with asynchronous 
checkpointing.  We need the business operations to reorder.   
Amazon’s Dynamo does not do this by itself.  The shopping cart 
application on top of the Dynamo storage system is responsible for 
the semantics of eventual consistency and commutativity. 
The authors think it is time for us to move past the examination of 
eventual consistency in terms of updates and storage systems.  
The real action comes when examining application based 
operation semantics. 
6.5 The “Operation-Centric” Pattern 
Both the Dynamo/Shopping-Cart example and the Banking 
example show the capture of the application’s desires. 
The Shopping-Cart example uses “add-to-cart” and “delete-item-
from-cart” operations to capture the intention of the user as they 
add and delete items from the cart.  In the Dynamo blob store, the 
usage of this operation-centric approach offers resiliency to the 
occasional interleaving of versions that results from replication 
combined with choosing availability over consistency.  It is 
interesting to note that operation-centric work can be made 
commutative (with the right operations and the right semantics) 
where a simple READ/WRITE semantic does not lend itself to 
commutativity. 
In the Banking example, “debit” and “credit” operations are 
processed at separate replicas and then shared as soon as possible.  
Again, this is an operation-centric approach which results in 
commutativity of the operations.  Allowing the loose-coupled 
processing of the “debit” and “credit” operations will occasionally 
(but rarely) result in a cleared check that we hope would have 
bounced.  Still, for many environments, this is an acceptable 
business expense and may be codified in a business rule for 
loosely coupled systems.  
7. Managing Resources with Asynchrony  
This section looks at how resources are managed in the face of 
asynchronous checkpointing and the possibility of independent 
work and potentially redundant work. 
First, we consider how resources get allocated across loosely-
coupled systems and whether they are over-booked or over-
provisioned.  After this, we observe that the computers’ opinions 
do not necessarily map to the real world in the face of accidents 
and other mistakes.  Next, we look at one example pattern of 
conservative (over-provisioned) resource management in the 
“seat-reservation” pattern.  Then, we consider the advantage of 
making resources similar (or “fungible”) whenever possible.  
Following this, we look at the use of unique identifiers in the 
management of asynchronous requests.  Moving along, we 
consider eventual consistence and asynchronous management of 
resources.  Finally, we consider the patterns that existed in 
business before the rise of computers and their use as inspiration 
in our design of loosely-coupled systems. 
7.1 Over-Booking versus Over-Provisioning 
As we consider a system with asynchronous checkpointing, we 
are considering a system with a probability that two or more 
replicas will be allocating resources to their users.  Since these 
replicas will sometimes be incommunicado, we must consider the 
policy used for allocating resources while not in communication.  
There are two approaches: 
1) Over-Provisioning.  In this approach, each replica has a fixed 
subset of the resources that it may allocate.  If there are 1000 
books in inventory, each of the two replicas may have 500 to 
sell.  When over-provisioning, a replica cannot make the 
mistake of allocating a resource that is not truly available to 
be allocated.  On the other hand, over-provisioning means 
that there will be excess resources kept within the replicas. 
2) Over-Booking.  Unlike over-provisioning, over-booking 
allows for the possibility that the disconnected replicas will 
occasionally promise something they cannot deliver.  By 
allowing independent allocation without ensuring strict 
partitioning of the resources, sometimes commitments are 
made that cannot be kept.  On the other hand, sometimes 
business will be scheduled that would be declined under the 
strict partitioning of over-provisioning. 
It is possible to be conservative and ensure you NEVER have to 
apologize to your customers.  This will, however, sometimes 
result in you deciding to decline business you would rather have.  
You may accept the business on a disconnected replica without 
the confidence that you will be able to keep your commitments.  
You can dynamically slide between these positions (while you are 
connected) and adjust the probabilities and possibilities. 
In the face of disconnection, you cannot know the perfect answer 
and must adopt a business policy that allows for the tradeoffs that 
are right for your business! 
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7.2 Computing versus Reality 
In the previous section, we described how over-provisioning of 
resources means you cannot make the mistake of allocating a 
resource that is not truly available.  This is true in that the 
computational resource will not show an allocation for which 
there are no resources.  Unfortunately, the real world is not always 
accurately modeled in the computers (and cannot always be). 
Consider a case where the only book in inventory is scheduled for 
delivery.  Due to an over-provisioning  scheme, there is no 
confusion about the inventory and the book is promised to a 
customer.  In preparing the book for shipment, it is run over by 
the forklift in the warehouse.  So, over-provisioning 
notwithstanding, you need to apologize! 
Even if the computer systems are perfect, business includes 
apologizing because stuff will go wrong! 
7.3 The “Seat Reservation” Pattern 
In certain real world transactions, the resources involved are not 
considered fungible.  One good example is reserving a seat at a 
concert where the actual seat(s) are considered critical to the 
buying decision. This sets up a condition where prime seats are 
crucial both from the perspective of the supplier and consumer. 
One way to implement a correct application which maintains the 
business rule that any seat must either be “available” or “occupied 
and associated with a valid purchase” is to use a database 
transaction to scope and protect the business rule.  This scheme 
works if you have a trusted agent handling the purchase. Ticketing 
agents would control the transaction and reserve potentially 
available seats. If a purchaser reneges, the transaction is rolled 
back making the seats available for purchase again. 
Online buying situations, where the consumer is in control, 
changes the transaction in both space and time in ways that break 
our ticketing system in several ways. First off, in the space 
dimension, the consumer is not a trusted agent. Our transaction 
now extends beyond the trust boundary originally established for 
the system business rule. Secondly, in the time dimension, we 
have no way to constrain the time in which untrusted agents can 
hold our system in an inconsistent state. In this particular 
example, untrusted agents could exploit these aspects of the 
system to quickly start a set of transactions against prime seats, 
making them unavailable to others, and then reselling them at a 
profit. Seats that are not sold by our unscrupulous agent could be 
released by simply rolling back transactions at no cost.  
Anyone who has purchased tickets online will recognize the “Seat 
Reservation” pattern where you can identify potential seats and 
then you have a bounded period of time, (typically minutes), to 
complete the transaction. If the transaction is not successfully 
concluded within the time period, the seats are once again marked 
as “available”. This is done by using three states for seats: 
1. {“available”} 
2. {“purchase pending”, session-identity} 
3. {“purchased”, purchaser-identity} 
Individual database transactions are used to transition from one 
state to another and to durably enqueue requests to clean up seats 
abandoned in the “purchase pending” state. 
This is an example of sliding the allocation spectrum towards the 
“over-provisioning” side.  The seats are considered unique and 
coordination is mandated between the primary and backup 
ensuring a conservative (i.e. “over-provisioned”) management of 
the resources.   To avoid this challenge, we need to make a pool of 
resources. 
7.4 The Quest for Fungibility 
As you look at functions in the computing world, you see an ever 
increasing categorization of things into fungible buckets.  You 
can’t reserve room 301 at the Hilton but you can get a king sized 
non-smoking room. 
Consider a pork-belly.  What the heck is a pork-belly?  It is a term 
to describe a bunch of pork7.  By standardizing a collection of 
pork, it is possible to sell a pig before it is grown.   The existence 
of a pork-belly as a unit of trade has offered powerful financial 
mechanisms in support of the raising and distribution of pigs.  
Farmers can sell their pigs in advance of their maturation and 
moderate their risk. 
The real world is rife with algorithms for idempotence, 
commutativity, and associativity.  They are part of the lubrication 
of real world business and of the applications we must support on 
our fault tolerant platforms.  A major trick is to look for 
mechanisms to create equivalence of the operation or resource. 
7.5 The Importance of Uniquifiers 
One important pattern in the management of asynchrony is the 
usage of the unique identifier in tracking the request through the 
distributed system.  Sometimes the over-zealous replicas will both 
do the work for a single request and only later detect that this 
work has been duplicated.   If the work has allocated a fungible 
resource, the system needs to detect this and return the 
redundantly allocated resource.  The detection of the redundant 
work is made possible by the uniquifier on the request. 
So, even as we look at the topic of managing resources under 
asynchrony, we see the importance of having uniquely identified 
requests so we can create idempotent behavior.  
7.6 Eventually We’ll Talk and Be Consistent  
As disconnected replicas work independently, they accumulate 
operations.  This is identical to a replica of the bank account 
clearing some checks but not others.  It is also identical to a blob 
in the Dynamo store having some of the operations to the 
shopping cart (e.g. “ADD-TO-CART” and “DELETE-FROM-
CART”) but missing out on other operations due to the timing of 
management of the replication. 
When the work flows together, a new, more accurate answer is 
created.  When an application is built to support eventual 
consistency, the design should ensure that the order of the work’s 
arrival at the node is not the determining factor in the outcome.  
Replicas that have seen the same work should see the same result, 
independent of the order in which the work has arrived. 
As mentioned above, sometimes the operations accumulated by 
different replicas result in a violation of the application’s business 
rules.  The bank account with independent replicas clearing 
checks may find an overdraft on the account that, in a centralized 
system, would have resulted in a bounced check rather than 
clearing too many checks for the available funds.  This level of 
violation of the business rules becomes a probabilistic analysis 
with the application designers choosing their stomach for risk. 
                                                                
7 Wikipedia describes a pork belly as the underside of a pig from 
which bacon is made.  A unit of trade is 20 tons of frozen, 
trimmed bellies.  See [21]. 
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7.7 Back to the Future 
Whenever the authors struggle with explaining how to implement 
loosely-coupled solutions, we look to how things were done 
before computers.  In almost every case, we can find inspiration in 
paper forms, pneumatic tubes, and forms filed in triplicate. 
Consider the lost request and its idempotent execution.  In the 
past, a form would have multiple carbon copies with a printed 
serial number on top of them.  When a purchase-order request was 
submitted, a copy was kept in the file of the submitter and placed 
in a folder with the expected date of the response.  If the form and 
its work were not completed by the expected date, the submitter 
would initiate an inquiry and ask to locate the purchase-order 
form in question.  Even if the work was lost, the purchase-order 
would be resubmitted without modification to ensure a lack of 
confusion in the processing of the work.  You wouldn’t change 
the number of items being ordered as that may cause confusion.  
The unique serial number on the top would act as a mechanism to 
ensure the work was not performed twice. 
8. CAP and ACID2.0 
As mentioned above, the CAP Theorem [13, 14] states that with 
Consistency, Availability, and Partition tolerance you can have 
any two at once but not three.  We do not argue with this. 
What is interesting is that the consistency for this is based upon 
the classic ACID.  That is: Atomic, Consistent, Isolated, and 
Durable.  The classic ACID has the goal to make the application 
perceive that there is exactly one computer and it is doing nothing 
else while this transaction is being processed. 
Consider the new ACID (or ACID2.0).  The letters stand for: 
Associative, Commutative, Idempotent, and Distributed [17].  The 
goal for ACID2.0 is to succeed if the pieces of the work happen: 
 At least once, 
 Anywhere in the system, 
 In any order. 
This defines a new KIND of consistency.  The individual steps 
happen at one or more system.  The application is explicitly 
tolerant of work happening out of order.  It is tolerant of the work 
happening more than once per machine, too. 
Notice that examples 4 (the shopping cart) and 5 (banking) meet 
this style of consistency. 
8.1 Fault Tolerance on ACID 
To maintain serializability, classic algorithms do one thing at a 
time.  All the concurrency mechanisms we know and love work 
hard to provide an appearance that one thing happens at a time.   
When considering the fault tolerant abstraction described in 
section 2, we see the focus on synchronous checkpointing and a 
linear history.  When correctness is defined by the classic ACID, 
it is essential to provide an ordering amongst the transactions.  
This is, of course, serializability [3, 10, 12]. 
It is interesting to contrast example #1 (Tandem circa 1984) and 
example #2 (Tandem circa 1986).  In example #1, the 
synchronous checkpointing of state to the backup occurs on a 
WRITE by WRITE basis.  This is correct but not necessarily 
highly performant.  In example #2, the synchronous capture of 
state is at the completion of the transaction.  Intra-transaction 
concurrency is managed by classic database management 
techniques.  Only when completing a transaction is it necessary 
ensure the work survives a fault.  
8.2 Fault Tolerance on ACID2.0 
OK, now let’s consider what happens to the concept of fault 
tolerance when you are NOT shooting for serializability (classic 
ACID) but rather for the new ACID of Associativity, 
Commutativity, Idempotence, and Distribution. 
If you break the algorithm for the desired work into pieces, each 
piece must be idempotent (just like in the basic approach to fault 
tolerance).  Furthermore, we are considering having the work 
distributed around the network rather than concentrated within a 
centralized system.  The only way to do this while preserving the 
old guarantees of classic ACID is with the well documented 
pessimistic or optimistic concurrency control mechanisms.  These 
tend to be fragile. 
When the application is constrained to the additional requirements 
of commutativity and associativity, the world gets a LOT easier.  
No longer must the state be checkpointed across failure units in a 
synchronous fashion.  Instead, it is possible to be very lazy about 
the sharing of information.  This opens up offline, slow links, low 
quality datacenters, and more. 
Surprisingly, we find that many common business practices 
comply with these constraints.  Looking at the business operations 
from the standpoint of how work has traditionally been performed 
shows many examples supportive of this approach.  It appears we 
in database-land have gotten so attached to our abstractions of 
READ and WRITE that we forgot to look at what normal people 
do for inspiration. 
9. Future Work 
It seems that it would be of great value to dissect different 
applications in business environments to see the recurring 
patterns.  What are the operations in play for various applications?  
When are they commutative?  What practices make the operations 
idempotent?  Are there different solutions that are recast 
syntactically in different environments?  Is there a taxonomy of 
patterns into which the various solutions can be cast? 
Our forefathers were VERY smart and were dealing with loosely 
coupled systems to implement their businesses.  They knit the 
loosely-coupled systems together with messages, telegrams, 
letters, and the postal system.  To cope, they needed reorderable 
operations.  Sometimes, the work was requested twice and this 
required protocols to implement idempotence.  How were these 
schemes used to run a railroad and build a Model-T?  Are these 
patterns still there waiting for us to use in our distributed systems?  
10. Conclusion 
We have reviewed some of the evolution in highly available and 
fault tolerant systems.  As far as we can see, all reliable systems 
are built out of a collection of unreliable components which are 
stitched together in a fashion that provides service in the face of 
the failure of some of these unreliable components.  Over time, 
the size of the failure unit has gotten larger and larger. 
For years, the state of the art in fault tolerant systems provided 
crisp transactional behavior by synchronously checkpointing state 
across the failure boundaries.  As the size of the failure unit has 
increased, the latency involved in synchronous checkpointing has 
grown to be punitive. 
In response to the increased latency, applications have embraced 
the asynchronous transmission of state across failure boundaries.  
That has required new models and patterns of application design. 
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We have attempted to describe the patterns in use by many 
applications today as they cope with failures in widely distributed 
systems.  It is the reorderability of work and repeatability of work 
that is essential to allowing successful application execution on 
top of the chaos of a distributed world in which systems come and 
go when they feel like it.  Application designers instinctively 
gravitate to a world of eventual consistency (usually without the 
formalisms to help them get there). 
Finally, we have examined this with respect to the CAP theory 
and described how, in this new world, many solutions are 
designed to take a relaxation of classic consistency to preserve 
both availability and partition tolerance.  This relaxed notion of 
consistency is very valuable and deserves more academic work. 
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